B. Against the Opinion

39. Against this opinion are the reasons that are taken from two middle terms: the first middle is from the idea of what is formally constitutive, the second from the distinction of emanations.

40. [From the idea of what is formally constitutive] - The argument from the first of these is as follows: by whatever something is formally constituted in being, by that it is distinguished, because it is by the same thing that anything is a being and is one (with the unity fitting such an entity), and, if it is one, then it is not distinct from itself and is distinct from others; but the Son is constituted in ‘personal being’ by filiation,     therefore he is by it formally distinguished from every other person; therefore , after everything else, and especially ‘later’ filiation, per impossibile or per incompossibile has been removed, the Son will by filiation remain distinct in person from any other person. - The assumption is plain, because the Son is not constituted in ‘personal being’ by active inspiriting, because that is common to the Father and the Son; and there are not in him other positive properties besides passive generation and active inspiriting; therefore etc     .

41. A response is that something is not distinguished by what is formally constitutive from anything at all, but only from things with which it most agrees and from which it is not distinguished in any save that formal way. An example: man is distinguished by rationality, not from a stone, but from the species of animal, with which he most agrees and from which he seems to be in very few things distinct; but he is distinguished from a stone by animality, because a stone is inanimate, but this animality is not formally constitutive of man. - So is it said in the intended proposition, that the Son agrees with the Father in active inspiriting, and is in this respect distinguished from the Holy Spirit; but by his own proper formality (namely filiation) he is distinguished from the Father, with whom he most agrees; wherefore     etc .

42. Against this [n.41], and first that anything possessing a certain existence is, by a distinction that belongs to that existence, distinguished from anything else through something that is of the idea of that in which it has such existence. Therefore      the Son is distinguished as a person through something which is of his idea insofar as he is a person, but active inspiriting is not of the idea of the Son, but, once the Son is already posited, it is as it were an adventitious property. From this it is plain that the example adduced is not to the purpose, because, although man is not distinguished from stone first by rationality, yet he is distinguished by something that is of his essence, so that it would be discordant for him to be distinguished from a stone through nothing that is of his essence but through risibility. So it is then in the intended proposition.

43. Secondly in this way: what is constituted is distinguished by what is formally constitutive of it from everything else, even if per impossibile all things other than it were removed, because by it is it first distinguished - that is adequately - from everything not such; but anything that does not have that constitutive form is not such; therefore by that form is it distinguished from everything else that does not have it.

44. This reason [n3] is made clear by the fact that, although man is distinguished from a stone not only by rationality but also by animality, he is not distinguished by rationality first as well, that is, he is not adequately distinguished by rationality (because then anything distinct from a stone would be rational), but he is first distinguished in the genus of ‘body’ from a stone by ‘animality’; however, after by intellect removing from man whatever is other than rationality, he would yet by that alone be essentially distinguished from whatever is not rational, and so from a stone, which is not rational. Therefore it is not only what distinguishes adequately that distinguishes really but also what, merely if it were posited, would be incompossible with that from which it is distinguished.

45. For this reason, taken from what is properly constitutive [n.40], there is a confirmation in that, if the Father per impossibile did not inspirit but the Son did, the Father would still be distinguished from the Son and from the Holy Spirit by paternity, just as he is by paternity constituted in his personal existence.

46. [From the distinction of emanations] - From the second middle term, namely from the distinction of emanations [n.39], the argument is as follows: generation is distinguished from inspiriting, and this when per impossibile everything other than the idea of generation and inspiriting is removed, or at any rate when the fact is removed that active inspiriting would be from the Son, provided however that the distinction of the principles of generating and inspiriting would stand; therefore also, when all such is removed, the distinction between Son and Holy Spirit would stand.

47. The proof of the consequence is that it is impossible for one person to receive existence from two total productions; for a person receives existence from no production or distinction such that, if the production or distinction were per impossibile removed, the person would no less receive existence; but if it received existence from this production and from that - and from each completely, because each would be perfect - then, when either was removed, it would have existence completely through the other, and so it would receive being from neither and from each.

48. To this reasoning certain responses, as to the antecedent, are made, and because this matter will be treated of in distinction 13 [I d.13 n.7], I do not now enter on it. The conclusions of the above reasonings [nn.40, 46] I concede, and the intended proposition will become clearer when the distinction of the emanations has been made clear [d.13].